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Realistic Utopianism and Alternatives to Imprisonment: 
The ideology of crime and the utopia of harm 
 
Lynne Copson1 
 
Abstract 
This article investigates the question of how we might begin to move beyond 
critique and towards the development of radical, yet realistic, alternatives to 
penal practices. In so doing an argument is made for the advancement of a 
zemiological ‘transpraxis’ as a primary site for realising meaningful change. 
Situating this discussion in the contemporary climate of penal dystopianism, the 
article first explores how the contemporary impulse is one largely born in 
critique. Highlighting a tension between the desire to effect meaningful change 
and the danger of legitimising the status quo, the article points to attempts to 
resolve this tension through a burgeoning interest in the concept of utopia as a 
form of praxis. However, by drawing on Mannheim’s distinction between 
‘ideology’ and ‘utopia’, the article proceeds to demonstrate that, despite their 
normative ambitions, efforts to realise ‘realistic utopias’ within contemporary 
criminal justice systems necessarily tend towards ‘ideology’ and reification of the 
existing system rather than alternatives to it. Highlighting parallels between 
Mannheim’s concepts and Foucault’s idea of ‘regimes of truth’, the article makes 
its central argument: that responding differently to crime begins by thinking and 
talking differently. It concludes by offering the discourse of social harm as a 
primary site of ‘transpraxis’, encouraging us to think beyond contemporary 
linguistic and conceptual frameworks to understand social problems, arguing 
that it is only through the adoption of a ‘replacement discourse’ of harm that we 
can start to build realistic utopias and meaningful alternatives to imprisonment. 
 
 
  
                                                          
1 Lynne Copson is Lecturer in Criminology at The Open University. Contact: 
lynne.copson@open.ac.uk 
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Introduction 
 
Concerns about the use of imprisonment, its pains and inadequacies and the 
search for better and more effective alternatives have been a central theme 
within criminology for much of its history. Belief in the possibility of realistic 
alternatives to prison, however, has waned from its heyday with the birth of 
abolitionism in the 1960s. That is not to say that such beliefs or the struggle for 
alternatives have disappeared. However, optimism in the possibility of their 
practical realisation has become muted, particularly in a contemporary climate 
of rising incarceration rates and increasingly punitive responses to crime (see 
Simon, 2014). At the same time, the contemporary climate of knowledge 
production has seen an increasingly uncomfortable relationship develop 
between government and the funding of criminological research (see Hillyard et 
al, 2004a; Walters, 2011), disciplinary specialisation and the suppression of 
normative theorising in social scientific research. This has led to a growing 
polarisation between, on the one hand, radical ideals with no means of effective 
translation and, on the other, practical reforms which seek to reform the 
existing system in a piecemeal fashion. Emerging from this context has been a 
renewed interest in the idea of utopianism as a means of realising genuine 
alternatives to the dominant discourse of crime and justice that resist simply 
becoming ‘add-ons’ to existing systems (Mathiesen, 1986; Mathiesen and 
Hjemdal, 2011/this volume). 
Against this backdrop, this article explores the extent to which such 
approaches offer a realistic strategy for challenging dominant paradigms of 
criminal justice. It situates the emergence of calls for more utopian theorising 
within criminology against a backdrop of increasing awareness of the 
inadequacies and harms of contemporary criminal justice which become all the 
more pressing in a climate of increasing rates of imprisonment, and the 
perceived absence of alternatives. Within such a climate, it argues, normative 
theorising becomes increasingly detached from issues of practical reform. 
Charting one response to this as lying in burgeoning interest in the concept of 
utopia, and particularly, an implicit notion of utopia as a form of praxis, 
particularly amongst penal theorists, the article highlights how the concept of 
‘real utopias’ (Wright, 2010) has been identified as one possible means of 
transcending existing approaches to criminal justice and penal reform, to offer 
meaningful alternatives. However, drawing on Mannheim’s distinction between 
ideology and utopia, the main argument is that, despite the best of intentions, 
such attempts are ultimately likely to serve ideologically to reinforce the status 
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quo rather than to transcend it. Specifically, it is maintained that, so long as we 
take the criminal justice system as the starting point of our critique and the locus 
for the construction of alternatives, reforms are destined to reinforce and 
legitimise the contemporary ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault, 1980) and dominant 
constructions of crime, harm and justice. Therefore, it is argued that it is only by 
identifying a different starting point and developing a new ‘replacement 
discourse’ (Henry and Milovanovic, 1991) for conceptualising social problems 
(and hence, means of their reform) that we can hope to move beyond the 
ideology of crime. Finally, the developing zemiological or ‘social harm’ approach 
is identified as a potential candidate for doing so. 
 
Contemporary criminal justice: a paradigm of inadequacy 
 
The harms and inadequacies of the criminal justice and penal systems are well-
documented. Not only do these systems fail to reduce reoffending (see, for 
example, Hillyard and Tombs, 2007: 14), but the penal system in particular, has 
long been recognised as a system of ‘pain delivery’ (Christie, 1981) which serves 
to dehumanise and inflict harm upon some of the most vulnerable members of 
society. However, these problems are arguably rendered more pressing within 
a contemporary context, in which increasing rates of imprisonment culminate 
in a crisis of mass incarceration (see Simon, 2014). That this should come at the 
same time as we are witnessing falling rates of crime (Garland, 2002; Office for 
National Statistics, 2016) arguably highlights the extent to which contemporary 
approaches to addressing crime, especially the use of imprisonment, have 
become detached from normative questions of what constitutes ‘justice’.  
Consequently, the criminal justice system is increasingly recognised as an 
‘industry’ (see Hillyard and Tombs, 2007). Rather than offering an impartial, 
objective means of addressing harm and delivering ‘justice’, it is argued that the 
criminal justice system provides a specific lens through which harmful acts are 
shaped and constructed in particular ways (Pemberton, 2007), with particular 
implications for the imagining of appropriate responses and ‘justice’ (see also 
Hillyard and Tombs, 2007). Whilst this has constituted a key theme in 
abolitionist thinking (see, for example, Hulsman, 1986), this critique has been 
developed more recently through the emerging perspective of zemiology 
(Hillyard et al, 2004b; Dorling et al, 2008). 
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The individualising logic of criminal justice 
 
Proponents of the zemiological perspective, in particular, have highlighted the 
individualising logic of criminal justice, which serves to hold individuals to 
account for their behaviour at the expense of the broader contexts of inequality, 
exclusion and social marginalisation in which the majority of offending occurs 
(Hillyard and Tombs, 2007: 15-16). Reinforced by a penal system which focusses 
on individual education and reform as the means of rehabilitation, this has led 
to claims that, not only is the criminal justice system essentially doomed in its 
quest to tackle offending, but that it operates ideologically to recast wider social 
problems as individual failings (see Carlen and Tombs, 2006). 
 
The neglect of victims 
 
The criminal justice system has also been criticised in its failure to address 
adequately the needs of victims, at worst contributing to their secondary 
victimisation (see Hoyle and Zedner, 2007). Moreover, it plays an important role 
in determining legitimate victimhood in the first place, with a number of 
commentators pointing out that many of those harms that are recognised 
through the criminal justice system are often relatively trivial events which 
‘would not score particularly high on an imaginary scale of personal hardship’ 
(Hulsman, 1986: 65) when compared with many, arguably more significant 
harms we are likely to face during our lifetime (Hillyard and Tombs, 2007).  
Thus the contemporary criminal justice system arguably constitutes a 
paradigm of inadequacy on a number of grounds: it fails to realise its own 
explicit raison d’être in terms of tackling crime; it functions as a system of pain 
delivery which fails to recognise the needs of victims and offenders alike; and 
constructs particular harms – and the solutions to these – in particular, 
individualised ways. 
 
Contemporary penal dystopianism 
 
Despite recognising these inadequacies within the criminal justice and penal 
systems, however, the contemporary impulse is one born largely in critique. It 
appears that, as critical scholars, activists, and citizens, we are far better at 
deconstructing existing systems than positively constructing meaningful 
alternatives (Lippens, 1995; Zedner, 2002). Even where evidence of an impulse 
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toward the latter exists, this is often diluted over time via its translation into 
routine politics. 
Part of the problem, no doubt, is the dominance of the criminal justice 
paradigm itself. As Shapland et al argue: 
 
western criminal justice has, through the state adoption of powers 
of trial and punishment, removed not only responsibility for the 
future from participants, but even the need and the habit of 
thinking about the future consequences of offending. (2006: 515) 
 
Accordingly, even where attempts are made to offer potentially radical 
alternatives to the existing criminal justice apparatus, these are typically co-
opted ‘add-ons’ (Mathiesen, 1986: 86; Mathiesen and Hjemdal, 2011: 225), 
offering piecemeal reforms at best, and/ or forms of ‘transcarceralism’ at worst 
(see Carlen and Tombs, 2006). Therefore, they typically ultimately serve to reify 
the status quo rather than fundamentally engage with, or challenge the 
underlying normative premises of that system. This has implications both for 
how harms are constructed and are to be addressed, with emphasis placed upon 
individual reform as the solution to crime. 
 
Recognising victims within the criminal justice system 
 
An example can be seen with the increasing inclusion of victims within 
conventional justice apparatuses via the development of the Code of Practice 
for Victims of Crime (Home Office, 2015), and growing use of Victim Personal 
Statements (Ministry of Justice, 2013; see also Hoyle and Zedner, 2007).  
However, these have arguably resulted in the increasing incorporation of 
victims and restorative justice within conventional justice apparatuses, rather 
than the development of genuine alternatives (see Marshall, 1996; Shapland et 
al, 2006). For example, the use of Victim Personal Statements sees them 
deployed only after the guilt of an offender, within the conventional criminal 
justice system, has been determined and they do not permit the views of the 
victim on an appropriate punishment to be considered. If they are read in court, 
it is also for the court to determine which sections are to be presented (Ministry 
of Justice, 2013), such that, at every step, victim experience is channelled within 
existing frameworks of justice. Such measures therefore, whilst seeking to give 
voice to victims’ experiences, only do so to the extent to which they are 
compatible with existing criminal justice frameworks.  
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Restorative Justice  
Similarly, there has been increasing research into restorative justice processes 
within the criminal justice system, particularly in relation to juvenile crimes (cf. 
Home Office, 2002; Youth Justice Board, 2006; Muncie, 2009: 326-331). 
Restorative justice has been promoted as a means of salvaging conflicts from 
the processes of criminal justice, which construct them in particular ways to the 
exclusion of those directly involved in them and a consideration of the broader 
social contexts (see Christie, 1977).  
However, just as victim statements are only employed post-conviction, in 
existing practices of restorative justice ‘[t]he relevant stage in criminal justice 
is[…] sentencing or the penal process, not the trial process/determination of 
guilt’ (Shapland et al, 2006: 507). Because of this, those involved in restorative 
justice find themselves already cast in the roles of victim and offender. This has 
the effect of already closing down alternative ways of framing conflicts and 
developing responses that might go beyond the views of ‘justice’ and concerns 
of the criminal justice system, such as the traditional focus on individual reform 
for preventing future offending (see ibid: passim). Again, the use of such 
measures within the criminal justice system is criticised for its implicit reification 
of the normative frameworks of the dominant criminal justice paradigm. 
This is not to deny that strategic advances have been made, nor the potential 
of such measures to ‘influence and even slightly moderately transform criminal 
justice’ (Shapland et al, 2006: 523). Indeed, evaluations of restorative justice 
within youth justice, for example, have highlighted ‘the more positive lines of 
communication that have been opened up between offenders, parents, victims 
and communities’ (Muncie, 2009: 330) despite recognising its problems and 
limitations. Therefore, one can recognise that the danger of a tendency to 
describe anything short of wholesale radical reform as serving an ideological 
function is that this may legitimise stagnation and inaction in addressing 
immediate problems for ‘fear of buttressing an unjust[…] system’ (Loader, 1998: 
204).  
At the same time, there is still a concern that without more effective 
translation of specific policy reforms into a broader positive politics of change, 
even the most critical approaches to contemporary criminal justice are destined 
to act as no more than a ‘scientific “alibi”’ (Garland, 1992: 404) for existing 
criminal justice and penal practices. 
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Reimagining vs. reifying the criminal justice system 
 
This tension between effecting meaningful change and legitimising the existing 
system is increasingly recognised by critical criminologists and penal scholars 
alike (see Barton et al, 2011; Loader and Sparks, 2011; Young, 2011). It is a 
tension that strikes at the very heart of the criminological project itself, 
reflecting criminology’s normative concern with questions of ‘justice’, and its 
practical project concerned to develop policies to address crime and/ or harm 
(Copson, 2013: 116-117).  
It is also a tension that has been well-recognised by those advocating reform 
of criminal justice in general, and penal systems in particular (see Mathiesen, 
1986; Mathiesen and Hjemdal, 2011; Scott, 2013). As Scott and Gosling 
highlight: 
 
There are many difficulties when attempting to promote 
alternatives to prison varying from net widening […] to falling 
through the net […]. Radical alternatives must be able to 
incorporate both an engagement with the problems and 
possibilities of our historical moment, whilst simultaneously 
disrupting punitive and other ideologies which facilitate social 
inequalities. (2016: 53) 
 
Accordingly we appear to reach an impasse between propping up the status quo 
through practical, but small-scale reforms to the existing system and advocating 
radical social reform without offering any means of doing so. It is this impasse 
that, perhaps, largely explains the contemporary tendency towards penal 
dystopianism – even, in some cases, anti-utopianism – and an emphasis on 
critique, without a positive politics for social change.  
The importance of critique in inspiring social change should not be 
overlooked and the reluctance to impose change reflects an implicit recognition 
of the dangers of doing so: as history has taught, too often reforms that have 
been imposed for the greater good have come at great cost to others (see 
Copson, 2013: 119-121, [forthcoming]). However, the result has been a 
loosening of normative theorising within criminology, from the practical project 
of addressing crime, as refuge is sought in small-scale improvements which, 
whilst leaving untouched the broader structure of society, do not run the risk of 
making things much worse than the status quo.  However, they are unlikely to 
make it vastly better either. 
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However, we are currently witnessing increasing calls for a recoupling of 
these strands as a means of moving beyond this impasse (see, for example, 
Zedner, 2007; Loader and Sparks, 2011; see also Copson, 2013, 2014, and 
[forthcoming]). There appears to be a renewed commitment to more normative 
theorising within social science in general (see Wright, 2010; Levitas, 2013), and 
criminology in particular. This is seen as crucial to moving beyond contemporary 
penal dystopianism and enabling us to connect normative ideals with practical 
reforms in a way that will enable us to move beyond reification of the 
contemporary regime. Included within this has been a burgeoning interest in 
the field of utopianism (see Young, 1992; Lippens, 1995; Malloch and Munro, 
2013; this issue).  
 
Ideology and Utopia 
 
Since its introduction as the title of Sir Thomas More’s (1516) work, the term 
‘utopia’ has negotiated an ambiguous and often contested terrain. Coined as a 
pun playing on the terms outopia (‘no place’) and eutopia (‘good place’), the 
term simultaneously juxtaposes questions of possibility with conceptions of 
desirability (Levitas, 1990: 2).  
Whilst space denies justice to a full account of the ambiguity and 
contestation that characterises the history of attempts to use and define 
‘utopia’ – though see Levitas (1990) for an excellent account of this – one 
definition identifies utopia with a blueprint for realising a proposed good society 
(see also Levitas, 2013), reflecting, perhaps, ambiguity as to whether More’s 
utopia was intended as a serious proposal for the instantiation of the good 
society (Carey, 1999: 38-39). Another, and perhaps the most common, approach 
has been to restrict the definition of utopia to a literary form (see, for example, 
Kumar, 1991).  
However, despite its proliferation as a common definition, there remain 
those suspicious of confining utopia to a literary form (see Jameson, 2007). This 
is particularly so given a contemporary context in which fictional and holistic 
outlines of the good society typical of the utopian literary genre are arguably in 
decline (see for example, Kumar, 2003). Moreover, the general identification of 
utopia as literary fiction has typically been undertaken in order to facilitate 
discussion of its role as a means of critical reflection upon contemporary society, 
rather than ‘an exercise of the literary imagination in and for itself’ (Kumar, 
1991: 24).  
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Common to both accounts of utopia as a blueprint for social change and the 
identification of the literary genre as a means of critically engaging with the 
established social world is, arguably, the idea of utopia as a form of praxis. 
Through the presentation of alternative forms of society, it is suggested,  
 
Utopia’s value lies not in its relation to present practice but in its 
relation to a possible future. Its ‘practical’ use is to overstep the 
immediate reality to depict a condition whose clear desirability 
draws us on, like a magnet […] so utopia’s ‘nowhereness’ incites 
the search for it. (Kumar, 1991: 3)  
 
Accordingly, some theorists, and particularly those who deploy the term in the 
context of social theory and research, define ‘utopia’ as a form of praxis and a 
drive to practical action.  
An example of this is offered by Karl Mannheim who sought to distinguish 
ideas that serve to legitimate the status quo from those that bring about social 
change. Mannheim distinguishes utopia from ideology, arguing that this 
distinction lies in the transformative potential of utopia and the instantiation of 
an alternative social order it realises (Mannheim, 1960 [1936]: 173).  
It is this conception of utopia as a form of praxis that contemporary 
criminologists are apparently invoking in their calls for more normative 
theorising and utopianism within criminal justice research (see, in particular, 
Young, 1992). This can be seen in the emphasis that has been placed on the 
imagining of ‘realistic utopias’ in response to the perceived inadequacies of the 
existing criminal justice and penal systems (see, for example, Loader, 1998; 
Scott, 2013; Scott and Gosling, 2016). At the same time, the tension highlighted 
between effecting meaningful change and reinforcing and legitimating the 
status quo that emerges in contemporary calls to imagine alternatives to 
imprisonment arguably reflects the key distinction drawn by Mannheim 
between ideology and utopia.  
Both terms ‘ideology’ and ‘utopia’ have frequently become political labels 
used to discredit opposing ideas: ideology being used to suggest an individual is 
unaware of reality, misguided and a slave to the ideas of a powerful faction, with 
utopia being invoked, at times, to suggest naïveté – admirable in intention but 
impossible in reality. However, Mannheim distinguishes between ideological 
and utopian ideas in terms of their capacity for effecting social change. Whilst 
both ‘transcend the reality within which they occur’ (Levitas, 1990: 68) utopias 
‘tend to shatter, either partially or wholly, the order of things prevailing at the 
time’ (Mannheim, 1960 [1936]: 173). Ideological ideas, by contrast, are those 
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which, even whilst appearing to transcend the existing social order, ultimately 
reaffirm the status quo. They are  
 
the situationally transcendent ideas which never succeed de facto 
in the realization of their projected contents. Though they often 
become the good-intentioned motives for the subjective conduct 
of the individual, when they are actually embodied in practice their 
meanings are most frequently distorted. (Mannheim, 1960 [1936]: 
175) 
 
As such, the extent to which a form of thought can be considered ideological or 
utopian will depend upon the extent to which it questions the very premises 
upon which one’s own position is based. For, as Mannheim argues:  
 
As long as one does not call his [sic] own position into question but 
regards it as absolute, while interpreting his opponents' ideas as a 
mere function of the social positions they occupy, the decisive step 
forward has not yet been taken. (Mannheim, 1960 [1936]: 68) 
 
The tension between creating meaningful alternatives to current penal regimes 
and reinforcing dominant contemporary paradigms within contemporary 
criminal justice can thus be seen as a reflection of the distinction between 
ideology and utopia in Mannheim’s work. The question then becomes one of 
how we can escape this tension in order to construct ‘realistic utopias’ that take 
us beyond the provision of new forms of ideology and reinforcement of the 
status quo. 
Foucault argues that ‘[e]ach society has its régime of truth, its ‘general 
politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes 
function as true’ (1980: 131). As these ‘regimes of truth’ are necessarily 
predicated upon, and reinforcing of, the current social system, an alternative 
regime of truth is only possible by changing the current social structure. Thus,  
 
The essential political problem for the intellectual is not to criticise 
the ideological contents supposedly linked to science, or to ensure 
that his own scientific practice is accompanied by a correct 
ideology […]. The problem is not changing people’s consciousness 
– or what’s in their heads – but the political, economic, 
institutional régime of the production of truth’. (Foucault, 1980: 
133) 
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In this way, our lived social reality and contemporary ‘regime of truth’ can be 
considered mutually reinforcing, such that it is ultimately the structure of 
society that must be transcended if we are to realise a genuine alternative to 
the status quo.  
This arguably resonates to some degree with Mannheim’s distinction 
between ideology and utopia. Although recognising the very different 
philosophical positions to which Foucault and Mannheim respectively belong, 
we may nevertheless argue that it is only through altering the social context of 
production of discourses that they may realise their utopian potential, rather 
than lapse into ideological reinforcement. At the same time, however, owing to 
the dialectical relationship between regimes of truth and the socioeconomic 
and political systems to which they correspond, it is also through altering the 
discourses available to us that we may create a genuine alternative to the 
existing system. 
Thus, whilst critical scholars have sought numerous ways in which we might 
seek to move beyond existing approaches and offer meaningful alternatives to 
contemporary penal regimes in practice, so long as they remain wedded to the 
language of crime and criminal justice they arguably cannot help but lapse into 
ideological reinforcement by leaving unquestioned the premises upon which 
traditional conceptions of crime and justice have been based.  
 
The ideology of crime? 
 
Scott (2013), for example, invokes Erik Olin Wright’s (2010) calls to ‘envision real 
utopias’ as a means of engaging with and realising meaningful social change. 
Suggested by Wright as a means of reflecting the ‘tension between taking 
seriously emancipatory aspirations for a radically more humane and just world, 
and confronting the hard constraints of realism’ (2007: 27), Scott employs this 
concept as a means of developing what he terms an ‘abolitionist real Utopia’ 
(2013: 91), coupling a normative commitment to the abolition of criminal justice 
with a practical strategy of reform. He seeks to move ‘beyond’ contemporary 
criminal and penal justice frameworks by subverting them from within by 
‘exploiting gaps, cracks and crevices within existing policy and practice’ (Scott, 
2013: 92). In doing so, his approach is offered as an antidote to the 
contemporary retreat to critique of the existing system without a positive 
politics of reform (ibid: 97).  
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Scott situates his approach in an abolitionist critique of contemporary 
criminal justice and penal systems, arguing that in order to challenge the 
dominant paradigms of criminal justice and penality what is needed is 
 
a deconstruction of the ‘reality’ assembled through criminal 
processes and the adoption of the meanings and understandings 
derived from the situational wisdom of the life world where the 
conflict emerged, alongside the promotion of alternative means of 
conflict handling that recognise dignity, equality and social justice. 
(2013: 97) 
 
To build this in practice, Scott identifies a need to develop alternatives guided 
by ‘an abolitionist compass’ (ibid: 98). This compass is underpinned by a 
commitment to: protecting human dignity and minimising suffering; social 
justice; alternatives that challenge and contradict established practices; a 
genuine alternative to criminal justice; legal protections and accountability for 
any alternatives; and meaningful and relevant interventions which allow active 
participation in creating norms (Scott, 2013: 97-100). 
Whilst in the longer term, Scott suggests a number of ‘historically immanent 
policies, practices and designs’ (2013: 101) to address the material inequalities 
in society and thereby reduce recourse to punishment, he identifies five key 
alternatives which he regards as the primary concern for developing for ‘the 
actual visualisation of abolitionist real Utopia pragmatic interventions’ (ibid: 
103). These involve:  
 
1. Putting the victim of crime at the heart of responses  
2. Using alternative models to the criminal law for handling conflicts  
3. Providing more effective social support to help prevent crime from 
even occurring (through skills training, housing, healthcare etc.) 
4. Providing more voluntary treatment programmes to divert those 
who come into contact with the criminal justice system through 
‘illness’ 
5. Creating intentional communities for lawbreakers, thereby 
providing a more meaningful context to develop new skills and 
responses to problematic behaviours (Scott, 2013: 103-107) 
 
These are undoubtedly laudable and practical aims and one can see how, 
through their development, we might be able to begin to meaningfully reform 
the dominant criminal justice and penal responses. Moreover, one can 
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appreciate the need for pragmatic and practical measures if we are not to 
retreat into abstract theorising of alternatives with no means of their practical 
realisation, or anti-utopian acceptance of the status quo. However, it remains 
unclear how such measures will necessarily resist co-option within the existing 
criminal justice framework. 
This is a danger Scott himself acknowledges elsewhere, in his discussion of 
Therapeutic Communities as a radical alternative to prison (Scott and Gosling, 
2016). To avoid co-option it is suggested, alternatives must be deployed ‘beyond 
the criminal process’, specifically ‘before and instead of a prison sentence’ (ibid: 
63). However, one could argue that similar aims have historically underpinned 
restorative justice approaches also, and yet they have all-too-frequently 
become adjuncts of criminal justice as noted above.  
The problem here is that, so long as criminologists and abolitionists take the 
criminal justice and penal systems as their primary concern or the starting point 
against which they offer ‘alternatives’, they cannot help but reify that system 
and its associated conceptual frameworks.  
This is not to undermine the important role that such contributions can play 
in improving conditions within prisons or reforming the criminal justice system. 
However, so long as such measures fail to question the very context of their 
production, they can only ever reinforce the contemporary ‘regime of truth’. 
Indeed, the overwhelming danger is that the discourses we use, including the 
discourse of crime and justice which characterises contemporary society, are 
not merely ideological constructions as has often been recognised (see, for 
example, Box, 1983). Rather, they are predicated upon and reaffirm a particular 
‘regime of truth’ and way of understanding the world, with particular 
implications for responding to crime and understanding justice.  
This is evident, for example, in accounts of restorative justice. In their 
research into restorative justice programmes within the criminal justice system, 
Shapland et al found that:  
 
participants, […] are bringing to it their similar, normative 
assumptions about justice, offenders and victims, which are 
propelling them culturally to similar activities and expressions. 
(2006: 522) 
  
This highlights the importance of context in shaping normative discussion. 
Similarly, it seems that so long as we invoke the language of crime and criminal 
justice, or penal abolitionism, we invariably set those systems as the normative 
yardstick against which alternatives will implicitly be measured.  
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As Henry and Milovanovic, in their articulation of ‘constitutive criminology’ 
have argued:  
 
discursive practices produce texts (narrative constructions), 
imaginary constructions, that anchor signifiers to particular 
signifieds, producing a particular image claiming to be reality. 
These texts become the semiotic coordinates of action, which 
agents recursively use and, in so doing, provide a reconstruction of 
the original form. (1991: 300) 
 
Therefore, it is a central premise of the argument put forward here that the 
search for meaningful and genuine alternatives in responding to crime must 
start by thinking and, ultimately, talking differently about crime. 
 
The utopia of ‘harm’? 
 
The premise that the search for meaningful and genuine alternatives in 
responding to crime must start by thinking and, ultimately, talking differently 
about crime is both inspired by and reflected in the emergence of ‘zemiology’ 
or ‘a social harm perspective’ (see Hillyard et al, 2004b; Dorling et al, 2008). 
Within this perspective, the idea of social harm has increasingly been deployed 
as part of an attempt to highlight the shortcomings of criminology’s focus on 
crime and as a basis upon which to establish a more holistic framework for 
understanding and addressing harm.  
 
Deconstructing criminology 
The roots of the zemiological approach can be located in the development of an 
increasingly critical orientation towards criminology itself in response to the 
renewed focus on criminal justice and preventative techniques of crime control 
with the advent of administrative criminology and criminal justice science in the 
late twentieth/early twenty-first century. There has been an increasing concern 
to deconstruct the discipline of criminology, pointing to its formation within 
existing structures of power (see Tifft and Sullivan, 2001) which, it is argued, has 
reinforced conventional constructions of both crimes and criminals (see, for 
example, Matthews and Kauzlarich, 2007). As Smart notes, ‘[t]he thing that 
criminology cannot do is deconstruct “crime”’ (1990: 77). Therefore, whilst 
critical criminology has highlighted the differential construction and 
deployment of legal constructions of crime, Hulsman notes, ‘the ontological 
reality of crime, has not been challenged’ (1986: 66). Consequently, we remain 
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‘stuck in a catascopic view of society in which our informational base [...] 
depends mainly on the institutional framework of criminal justice’ (ibid: 67-68). 
Thus, contemporary approaches to crime and justice have increasingly 
sought to ‘decriminalise criminology’ (Muncie, 2000) and ‘decentre crime’ from 
public discourse (ibid) through the positing of ‘harm’ as a more useful concept 
for understanding social phenomena (see also Milovanovic and Henry, 2001; 
Tifft and Sullivan, 2001).   
 
‘Beyond’ the discourse of crime 
Presenting an explicit shift away from focussing on crime, key proponents of the 
zemiological perspective identify a number of critiques of criminology which 
reiterate existing critical criminological critiques regarding the social 
construction of crime and the operations of the existing criminal justice system, 
but also seek to move beyond them.  
A central thesis of the perspective is that the discourse of crime excludes a 
whole host of harmful experiences for which no discrete cause or causal agent 
can be identified, neglecting the way in which apparently individualised, 
monocausal harms may be located in wider networks of systemic harm such as 
capitalism, racism, or patriarchy. It also reinforces a false dichotomy between 
legality and illegality which, when taken to its extreme, implicitly legitimates 
non-criminalised harms by virtue of the absence of sanction (and thus formal 
recognition) against it. In so doing, it ultimately implicitly reinforces, rather than 
challenges, the criminal justice agenda set by the State (Hillyard and Tombs, 
2007).  
Therefore, central to this perspective is the argument that the discourse of 
‘crime’ and criminal justice structures our interpretations and responses to 
social phenomena in particular ways. Thus, so long as we continue to talk in the 
language of ‘crime’ and criminal justice, we cannot escape the perspective or 
‘truth’ such language both requires and perpetuates.  
By contrast, as Muncie (2000) notes,  
 
[t]he redefining of crime as harm opens up the possibility of 
dealing with pain, suffering and injury as conflicts and troubles 
deserving negotiation, mediation and arbitration rather than as 
criminal events deserving guilt, punishment and exclusion.  
 
Drawing attention away from legally defined crimes and locating criminal harms 
in broader systems of socioeconomic inequality and injustice, critical 
criminology challenges the capacity of the penal system to realise justice. It also 
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encourages the development of alternative policies better able to address the 
harms people experience and to realise the crime-free society. 
 
Social harm: a replacement discourse  
With this in mind, proponents of the social harm perspective point to the power 
of using an alternative discourse around ‘harm’ as a means of mobilising the 
‘subjugated knowledges’ of harm excluded by the contemporary criminal justice 
regime (Hillyard and Tombs, 2007: 21). They point to the need for 
methodological tools ‘to “debunk” the persuasive narratives of “crime” and 
create the discursive spaces where the marginalized can articulate their lived 
experience of harm without persistent reference to the notion of “crime”’ 
(Pemberton, 2007: 33).  
By changing the language according to which we come to articulate and 
understand social phenomena, through the offering of a ‘replacement 
discourse’ (Henry and Milovanovic, 1991) to that of ‘crime’, policy responses can 
be devised and implemented to more effectively prevent and address harms 
people experience ‘from “cradle to grave”’ (Pemberton, 2007: 34) than either 
current penal policy or the penal reforms with which critical criminologists have 
typically been preoccupied (see also Hillyard and Tombs, 2007). Such an 
approach can still admit that conventional ‘crimes’ are harmful, but also allow a 
more nuanced conception of the harmful nature of the systems that generate 
them. Whilst contemporary approaches to criminal justice reform have long 
recognised the way in which criminal harms are often premised on structures of 
inequality, marginalisation and exclusion, so long as the focus of reform remains 
on existing processes and institutions, as we have seen, the risk is that the 
solutions to structural problems become recast as individual ‘treatments’ 
through the individualising logic which underlies both the concept of crime and, 
by extension, criminal justice. 
Thus, whilst underlying this approach is a commitment to developing a more 
socially just, safe, and equitable society in which social harm is significantly 
reduced if not eradicated, the shift towards a language of harm demands a 
broader policy focus which transcends existing specialisms to address a whole 
host of issues across institutions, rather than on improvements to the criminal 
justice system. The creation of alternative discursive spaces for articulating 
harm outside the conceptual framework of crime, it is advocated, will facilitate 
the remedy of such harms by a more joined-up and comprehensive social policy 
approach (Pemberton, 2007: 33; see also Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009 for 
examples of specific policies).  
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Realistic utopianism? 
 
By shifting to the language of harm as a ‘replacement discourse’ (Henry and 
Milovanovic, 1991), zemiology and the discourse of social harm can be seen as 
offering an important means of realising ‘realistic utopias’ that take us beyond 
the ideology of crime and criminal justice. However, if the history of the co-
option of alternatives to conventional criminal justice has taught us anything it 
is that the power of existing structures of thought is not easily resisted, 
particularly in a climate where all too often academic research is shaped by 
issues of access to funding. As many have noted, the contemporary climate of 
academic funding and research means that often the research agenda is shaped 
by external forces and interests (including those of government) which can, in 
turn, feed into the replication of existing discourses around crime (see Hillyard 
et al, 2004a; Walters, 2011). Such forces are not easily resisted. Even in those 
cases where they have been, we bear witness to the costs of doing so.  
The high-profile dismissal of Professor David Nutt from the Government’s 
Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs offers a prime example of the strength 
of resistance to attempts to present a ‘replacement discourse’. This dismissal 
followed Nutt’s analysis of the harms of recreational drugs (see Tran, 2009) and 
resulting claims that many of those drugs we criminalise are less harmful than 
those we do not, such as alcohol and tobacco (Nutt, 2009). Such potential costs 
would make many researchers, especially those at the start of their career 
without the security of an established position or international acclaim, think 
twice about radically challenging the conventional wisdom on a given issue.  
There is also a danger of holding out the discourse of ‘harm’ as a panacea to 
eradicating the problems of ‘crime’ and replication of the status quo. Immediate 
questions, acknowledged by proponents of the zemiological perspective 
themselves, stem from concerns as to whether ‘harm’ is any less socially 
constructed than ‘crime’, and the possible dangers of majoritarianism and 
relativism in any attempt to define harm (see Hillyard et al, 2004b: 271-275; 
Pemberton, 2007; 35-37). 
Another danger, arguably neglected by proponents of the social harm 
perspective, is the extent to which the discourse of crime permeates our very 
perceptions of harmfulness. For example, there is a sense in which people 
perceive ‘crimes’ as ‘worse’ than other harms (see Ashworth, 1986: 105).  
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Similarly, the individualising tendency identified as underlying the concept 
of crime arguably constitutes a framework of understanding, reflected in 
broader attitudes that often seek to blame clear, identifiable individuals for 
harms. For example, reflecting on his analysis of jury decision-making 
concerning the awarding of damages in civil cases in the US, Feigenson suggests 
that people ‘may be inclined to think about accidents in simplified, personalized, 
and moralized ways because that is a predominant way in which the culture at 
large constructs its accounts of accidents and many other kinds of events’ (2000: 
14).  
Mannheim distinguishes ‘relative’ from ‘absolute’ utopias, where a relative 
utopia is one ‘which seems to be unrealizable only from the point of view of a 
given social order which is already in existence’ (Mannheim, 1960 [1936]: 177). 
Given the cultural and political power of the discourse of crime within 
contemporary society (see Loader and Sparks, 2011), a practical zemiological 
application must take seriously its ‘relative’ impracticability within a 
contemporary context if it is to offer a realistic alternative discourse. 
That said, as Foucault has noted, challenging the existing ‘regime of truth’ is 
‘not a matter of emancipating the truth from every system of power […] but of 
detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and 
cultural, within which it operates at the present time’ (1980: 133). The 
democratic commitment of the zemiological perspective to the unearthing of 
‘subjugated knowledges’ therefore arguably provides the means through which 
we can conceptualise the translation of the discourse of social harm as a means 
of constructing ‘realistic utopias’. 
 
From abolitionist praxis to zemiological transpraxis 
The discourse of crime, as the history of critical strands of criminology has 
demonstrated, reflects the interests of those with the social power to define it. 
It is a discourse which, in Foucault’s words, reflects ‘the status of those who are 
charged with saying what counts as true’ (1980: 131). As such, it is inexorably 
linked to the current status quo, the current ‘regime of truth’, and precisely 
those ‘forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which [the 
power of truth] operates at the present time’ (ibid: 133).  
By contrast, zemiology, with its ideal of democratic unearthing and 
articulation of experiences of harm, without reference to the discourse of crime, 
as the basis for social policy may be seen as the first step towards realising this 
emancipation from the current ‘regime of truth’. This discourse operates not 
merely at the superficial level but presents a form of ‘transpraxis’ whereby: 
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If praxis is taken to be purposive social activity born of human 
agents’ consciousness of their world, mediated through the social 
groups to which they belong […] Transpraxis assumes that critical 
opposition must be aware of the reconstitutive effects – the 
reproductions of relations of production – in the very attempts to 
neutralize or challenge them. (Henry and Milovanovic, 1991: 295) 
 
Conclusion  
 
Therefore, whilst the endeavours of critical scholars engaged in the search for 
‘realistic utopias’ within the current penal system reflect an idea of utopia as 
praxis, they nevertheless cannot help but tend towards Mannheimian ideology. 
This is because, so long as they take crime and criminal justice as their starting 
point, they implicitly reify a ‘regime of truth’ that constructs ‘crime’ and 
processes of criminal and penal justice as the most pressing social issue and 
primary site for effecting social change, a position that has historically been 
supported and sustained by the very discipline of criminology itself. By contrast, 
it is only by engaging in strategies that challenge the very premises upon which 
these approaches are based, by offering alternative discourses and starting 
points, defined outwith existing disciplinary confines, that we can make the shift 
towards transpraxis and from ‘ideology’ to ‘utopia’. As such, a perspective 
conceived around giving voice to subjugated experiences of harm typically 
excluded from academic theorising offers a genuinely ‘new’ starting point for 
conceptualising and responding to social problems. In this way, the zemiological 
perspective presents a means for moving beyond the existing context of 
knowledge-production and challenging the current ‘regime of truth’ in a way 
that radical perspectives within criminology cannot hope to. By challenging the 
primacy of crime, criminal justice and penal responses it opens up a horizon in 
which genuine and meaningful alternatives to these systems can be imagined, 
beyond the reification of the systems it seeks to oppose. 
In conclusion, as this paper has sought to demonstrate, whilst the 
inadequacies and harms of the criminal justice and penal systems are well-
recognised, interest in utopianism as a form of praxis has emerged as a means 
of challenging contemporary penal anti-utopianism. However, current attempts 
at meaningful reform are limited. These are undeniably important as a challenge 
to contemporary dystopianism and anti-utopianism amongst critical scholars, 
and a necessary antidote to the increasing specialisation and polarisation 
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between radical normative theorising and practical projects of piecemeal 
reform within criminal justice research. However, so long as they take these 
systems and their failings as their starting point, such attempts will necessarily 
tend towards ideology and legitimation of the existing ‘regime of truth’ owing 
to their implicit reification of criminal justice discourse. It is therefore only by 
seeking a ‘replacement discourse’, such as that offered by social harm and 
zemiology, that we can find a new starting point outside criminology. It is only 
by transcending the ideology of crime and its normative underpinnings that we 
may take the first steps towards realising the practical utopia of harm. 
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